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A model of insider trading is used to analyze the behaviour of
trading volume in financial markets characterized by asymmetric
information. This model extends the one in Bhattacharya and Nico-
dano (2001) by introducing competition among informed traders
and imperfection of their private information. Contrary to the broad
implications of adverse selection models and according to some
empirical studies, this paper shows that trading volume is higher
when the insiders are active in the market. A higher level of out-
siders’ risky investment, due to an improved “risk sharing” among
them, leads to a higher level of trading. [JEL Codes: G14, D82, C72]
1. - Introduction
This paper extends the model of insider trading developed by
Bhattacharya and Nicodano (2001) and analyzes the behaviour of
trading volume in financial markets characterized by asymmetric
information.
Several previous models overlook trading volume and focus
either on liquidity or on agents’ welfare. Yet, trading volume con-
tributes, with liquidity, to define structure, size and efficiency of
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maining errors are my own.a financial market. Furthermore, several empirical works under-
line the importance of trading volume as a predictor of market
trend (Lo and Wang, 2001). Even so, the main reason for our fo-
cus on volume concerns a methodological aspect. As a matter of
fact, most models of insider trading show results concerning trad-
ing volume which are in contrast with empirical evidence. These
differences question the validity of these theoretical models, cer-
tainly with regard to this variable, but also in general as models
of asset markets under asymmetric information.
Indeed, most models of “informed trading” (Back, Cao and
Willard, 2000; Foster and Viswanathan, 1996; Grossman and
Stiglitz, 1980; Holden and Subrahmanyam, 1992; Kyle, 1985) at-
tribute a portion of market trades (outsider trades) to “noise
traders
1”, agents that operate in the market for exogenous reason,
and to uninformed agents who are agents without private infor-
mation. These models consider outsider trades as exogenous
2,
implying no impact of insider trading on outsiders investment
choices and, as a consequence, on trading volume.
Other models (George, Kaul and Nimalendran, 1994) show
that any uninformed agent, as long as the only reason of trade
concerns the asymmetric information, would not be willing to
trade within a market where some agents has private information,
consistent with “adverse selection” theory (Milgrom and Stokey,
1982). Therefore, insider trading has, according to these models,
a negative effect on uninformed agents trading volume.
Empirical studies which rely on court cases relevant to in-
sider trading show that it has a positive effect on investment levels
of uninformed agents. Then, trading volume increases
3 (Cornell
and Sirri, 1992; Fishe and Robe, 2004).
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1 They are often defined as “liquidity traders”.
2 This hypothesis is justified by their objective to analyze the informational ef-
ficiency of asset prices and the conditions that aid to the transmission of private
information to uninformed agents.
3 There is one study (CHUNG K.H. - JO H. - SHEFRIN H., 2003) which, using
market data to infer the insider trading influence on trading volume, confirm
“adverse selection” theory and show that the presence of informed agents leads
market makers to widen the bid-ask spread, inducing, as a consequence, unin-
formed agents to reduce the volume of their trades.This paper studies the impact of insider trading on trading
volume, using, as reference model, the one developed by Bhat-
tacharya and Nicodano (2001). In this model both noise traders
and uninformed agents are modeled as agents with well-specified
preferences. These agents allocate their endowments across a risky
long-term and a riskless short-term investment ex ante when their
intertemporal consumption preferences are uncertain. A shock to
their preferences
4 is then realized, inducing a subset of them (the
“early-diers”) to consume by selling their risky assets in the in-
terim asset market, before the payoff to their long-term investment
is realized.
Contrary to the models that assume a certain flexibility of the
investment choice in the interim stage (Leland, 1992), the model
presented in this paper, as in Bhattacharya and Nicodano (2001),
assumes instead inflexible ex ante aggregate investment portfolio
choices by uninformed agents. Interim assets prices are influenced
by a stochastic proportion of outsiders who sell and can be fur-
ther modified by the presence of insider trading. The interim con-
sumption and portfolio allocations of outsiders are clearly affect-
ed by a greater informativeness of asset prices brought about by
insider trading.
This paper extends this model by allowing for the presence
of two insider agents who receive imperfect signals on the future
risky return. Signal imperfection and competition among insider
agents affect the informativeness of asset prices
5 and consequently
also the investment choices of uninformed agents.
These two assumptions, and hence the extension of the model,
are supported by evidence. Consistent with imprecise signals, there
are some cases which show that informed agents gained negative
profits, which means they had imperfect information about asset
payoffs (Meulbroek, 1992). Several empirical works also show that
there are more than one insider in many insider trading cases.
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4 This can be interpreted as a shock to their other incomes.
5 Asset prices could convey a wrong information if the signals differ from fu-
ture risky return.
Strategic Insider Trading with Imperfect Information, etc.As in Bhattacharya and Nicodano (2001), also the model in
this paper has been worked out numerically, for reason of
tractability in the face of possibly binding interim liquidity con-
straints or “corner solutions”.
This paper is set out as follow. The main features of the model
and the solution method for it are described in Section 2, be-
ginning with the equilibrium with outsiders only (subsection 2.1)
and describing the insider trading equilibrium (subsection 2.2).
Section 3 analyzes the effect of signal imperfection and of oli-
gopoly of private information on informativeness of asset prices.
The analysis of numerical results concerning trading volume is
carried out in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. Appendix 1 gathers
all Proofs of Lemmas, Appendix 2 analyzes the effect of signal im-
perfection on insiders’ expected profits and Appendix 3 shows an
analytical development of trading volume.
2. - The Model
There are three time points t = 0, 1, 2 and two types of agents,
born at t = 0: “outsiders” (uninformed agents) and “insiders” (in-
formed agents).
As regards the outsiders, endowments can be invested either
in a risky technology paying off only at t = 2 or in a riskless stor-
age technology paying off at t = 1 and, if reinvested at t = 1, at t
= 2. Risky technology can, however, be traded in a “secondary
market” at t = 1 (“interim stage”), with selling by agents who wish
to consume early.
The storage technology has unit gross returns while the risky
technology has final payoffs per unit investment of θ˜ distributed
as:
(1) ˜ θ =
θ L with prob. π (≡π L)  {θ H with prob. 1 – π (≡π H) 
with: θ L < 1 < θ H
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agents and so is the (unconditional) expected return on the risky
asset:
(2) E(˜ θ ) = πθ L + (1 – π )θ H
that must be > 1 in order to sustain positive risky investment.
The outsider agents’ intertemporal preferences for consump-
tion can be described as follows. There are two “aggregate liq-
uidity states” {l, h} and associated conditional probabilities (0 <
α l < α h < 1) such that each agent’s utility function for consump-






1) with prob. {α l or α h}  { U(C
2) with prob. {(1 – α l) or (1 – α h)}
Therefore, an “outsider” will consume early (t = 1), because of
a liquidity shock, with probability α i for i ∈ 2 {l, h}, or late (t = 2)
with probability (1 – α i). These aggregate liquidity states {l, h} are
assumed to arise with ex ante probabilities q ≡ ql e (1 – q) ≡  qh. It
is assumed that {q, α l, α h} are common knowledge, but that each
uninformed agent only knows her own realized utility function
U(C
1,  C
2), but not the aggregate state. Moreover, we assume the
asset payoffs are independent of the liquidity states.
These ex ante random interim preferences, coupled with their
aggregate variability, have effects on interim asset prices similar
to those arising from noise trading.
Outsiders make per capita investment choices across two tech-
nologies. They invest K in the “short-term” asset and (1 – K) in
the “long-term” asset at t = 0. Agents who wish to consume at t
= 1 and those who wish instead to postpone their consumption
until t = 2 can trade their risky assets, thus determining equilib-
rium prices P(K, θ j, α i)
6, j ∈ {L,H}, i ∈ {l,h} per unit investment.
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6 P(K, θ j, α i) is the rational expectation equilibrium price mapping the under-
lying aggregate state, which includes the equilibrium investment choice K at t = 0.
Strategic Insider Trading with Imperfect Information, etc.The two “insiders”, instead, have an exogenous endowment of
the risky technology
7, from which they could choose to sell an
amount and reinvest the proceeds in the riskless technology at t
= 1. Since they are risk neutral, they maximize expected profits
conditional on their private information. At the “interim stage”
they receive two imperfect signals, ˜ S
1 and  ˜ S
2, which present the
same distribution:
(4) ˜ S = Sk with prob.
for k ∈ {L, H}
or:
(5) ˜ S =
SH with prob.  π HPr(SH|θ H)+π LPr(SH|θ L) { SL with prob.  π LPr(SL|θ L)+π HPr(SL|θ H)
where Sk is the event in which the “insider” receives a signal which
indicates a k-type future return. In particular, SH is the set of sig-
nal realizations such that ˜ S   θ H, while SL is the set of signal real-
izations such that ˜ S   θ L.
The conditional expected value of the risky return based on
the signal, is:
(6)
where, given Bayes’s Theorem:
(7)
It is important to notice that:
(8) E(θ˜ | Sk) ≠ E(θ˜) if Pr(θ j | Sk) ≠ Pr(θ j)










jk j jL H
S
S
S () = () ()
() () = ∑
   




θθ θ () = ()
=∑
   






RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2004
106
7 If n1 and n2 are the endowments (units of the risky technology) of the two
“insiders”, we assume also that nz ≥ [α h – α l] ∀ z ∈ {1, 2}.(9) E(θ˜ | Sk)=E(θ˜) if Pr(θ j | Sk)=Pr(θ j)
Hence, for higher levels of Pr(θ j | Sj) the conditional expected
value of the future risky return tends to the effective value. In par-
ticular, if the signal were perfect, Pr(θ j | Sj)=   1, then:
(10) E(θ˜ | Sj)=  θ j ∀ j ∈  {L,H}
Now, we can define the correlation coefficient between the
signals and an index of signal precision, two key concepts that
will help us in deriving the equilibrium strategies of the two in-
formed agents. Since the two signals are characterized by the same
distribution (and so by the same probabilities) it means that if the
signals were perfect, Pr(θ j | Sj)=  1  ∀ j ∈  {L,H}, the correlation co-
efficient would be equal to 1, Corr( ˜ S
1,  ˜ S
2) ≡ ρ S = 1. Therefore, the
lower is the above mentioned probability, the lower is the correl-
ation between the two signals.
As concerns the index of (relative) signal precision (Ψ ), it is
defined as follow:
(11)
Analogously, if the signals were perfect, the index of relative sig-
nal precision would assume value 1, since the conditional vari-
ance would be equal to 0. Again, the lower is the probability Pr(θ j
| Sj) ∀ j ∈  {L,H}, the lower is the index of relative signal precision.
Therefore, there is a positive relation between ρ S and Ψ .
Let  θ j represents the event in which the future return is j-
type, S
1
k the event in which the signal received by “insider” 1 in-
dicates a k-type future return, and S
2
s the event in which the sig-
nal received by “insider” 2 indicates a s-type future return. Then,
we can define the following joint probabilities:




s) = Pr(θ j)Pr(S
1
k | θ j)Pr(S
2
s | θ j, S
1
k)




















Strategic Insider Trading with Imperfect Information, etc.So, “insiders” strategic action will depend on these probabil-
ities, which determine PS (and Ψ ). The higher the signal correla-
tion coefficient, the higher the probability that the two informed
agents will act in the same direction.
2.1 Traded Equilibria without Insider Trading
Defining i ∈ {l, h} as the index of the liquidity state and j ∈
{L, H} as the index of payoffs, the consumption levels of “early-
diers” C
1
j (i) and “late-diers” C
2
j (i)a r e :
(13) C
1
j (i) = [K + (1 – K)Pj(i)]
(14) C
2
j (i) =  [(K – Pj(i)Xj(i)) + θ j(1 – K) + θ jXj(i)] 
where Xj(i) is the net amount of the risky asset that every “late-
dier” is inclined to buy at t = 1, paying the price Pj(i). Since in
an equilibrium without insider trading, Pj(i) and Xj(i) depend only
on the liquidity state i, we can omit the index j.
The following “market clearing” condition must be satisfied:
(15) (1 – α i)X(i) = α i(1 – K)
and since we assume that “late-diers”, wishing to consume only
at  t = 2, can not borrow at t = 1 from “early-diers”, we need a
“no-borrowing” condition:
(16) K – P(i)X(i)   0
Equations (15) and (16) together imply the “aggregate liquid-
ity” constraint on market-clearing prices:
(17) P(i)α i(1 – K)   (1 – α i)K
At  t = 0, in their ex ante choice of K, “outsiders” maximize
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liquidity state {l, h} and no private information about the future
risky return θ j, “late-diers” choose X(i) in order to:
(19)
Using the first-order conditions for the maximization problem
in (19) and the equation (15), we determine possible interim equi-
librium prices P(i, K) for a given K. These prices are found from
among the positive real roots, considering the aggregate liquidity
constraints in equation (17). The implied ex ante choice of K in
then derived using the maximization program in equation (18) and
taking the interim prices P(i) and trades X(i) as being given by the
earlier set of calculations, and iterate until convergence in K.
2.2 Noisy REE with Insider Trading
“Insiders” aim to maximize their expected profits conditional
on their private information. This requires to mask their presence
8
in order not to reveal their private information (as in Kyle, 1985
and in Gorton and Pennacchi, 1990). However, here each “insider”
must conjecture the other “insider’s” action because they can mask
their presence only if the aggregate quantity sold by them is such
that “late-diers” do not know whether they are buying from “early-
diers” or from the “insiders”.
DEFINITION 1
Insiders’ expected profit conditional on their private infor-
mation can be defined as follow:
(20)
   
ES q P i Q S S ki k s j k jsk
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Π




= = = ∑ ∑ ∑ θθ Pr ,
, , , 












8 “Early-diers outsiders” supply their “long-term” asset inelastically and hence
the “insiders” can mimic their sales only via (many small) market orders.
Strategic Insider Trading with Imperfect Information, etc.(21)
where  Q
1
k and  Q
2
s represent the amount of risky asset sold re-
spectively by insider 1 and insider 2, conditional on the type of
signal they receive.
So, the conditional expected profit of each “insider” is a di-
rect function of the quantity she has sold and indirect function of
the quantity sold by the other, the precision of the signals and
their correlation.
Since “insiders” will enter the market only if their signal have












2 if s = L
= { 0   if s = H
Therfore, if we consider “insider” 1, her expected profit con-








1)  if k = L { 0        if k = H
where:
(25)
The same holds for “insider” 2.
DEFINITION 2
The equilibrium strategies, Q
1* and Q
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We can now solve for the overall equilibrium. The “outsiders’”
consumptions are defined as follow:
(28) C
1
ks(i) = K + (1 – K) Pks(i)
(29) C
2
jks(i) = (K – Pks(i)Xks(i)) + ((1 – K) + Xks(i))θ j
∀ i ∈ {l, h}  and  ∀ j,k,s ∈ {L, H}
where  Pks(i) and Xks(i) are respectively the price and the net
amount of the “long-term” asset bought per unit of “late-diers”,
when the liquidity shock is i-type, “insider” 1 observes S
1
k and “in-
sider” 2 observes S
2
s. Equation (28) shows how “outsider early-
diers” consumption does not depend on the future risky return.
“Outsiders” trades at t = 1 must satisfy the “no-borrowing”
constraint:
(30) Pks(i)Xks(i)   K ∀ i,k,s
while the “aggregate liquidity” constraint incorporates “insiders’”
supply of risky assets:




s)]    (1 – α i) K
In the aggregate states {iks}
9 for  i ∈ {l, h} and k, s ∈ {L,H},
equilibrium prices Pks(i) and beliefs on θ
˜ conditioned to asset
prices (πˆj |Pks(i)) must satisfy the following market clearing con-
dition:




s) = (1 – α i)Xks(i)
At t = 0, in their ex ante choice of K, every “outsider” maxi-
mizes his ex ante expected utility:
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Strategic Insider Trading with Imperfect Information, etc.(33)
At t = 1, the “outsider late-diers” will choose the amount Xks(i)
to buy in the interim market in order to maximize their condi-
tional expected utility:
(34)











Given the two subset of values of the signal precision index,




represents the pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the strategic
game, which is the strategy that satisfies the equilibrium condi-
tions in Definition 2, where Q
M is the quantity which a monopol-
ist would trade in the market.
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which is the logic underlying proposition 1.
The strategies Q* ≠ {Q
M/2, Q
M} can be eliminated because only
the following two scenarios are possible: both the “insiders” enter
the market, only one “insider” enters the market. As a matter of
fact, since the informed agents want to enter the market avoiding
to reveal their private information, any other strategy would lead
to a revelation of their information in all aggregate states. Ac-
cording to the first scenario the optimal strategy would be  Q* =
Q
M/2, while according to the second Q* = Q
M.
In order to eliminate the dominated strategy, it is necessary
to compare the aggregate states in which the “insiders” are able
to mask their presence, according to the two possible equilibrium
strategies. If they supply Q
M/2, “late-diers” can not distinguish
between the aggregate states {hHH} and {lLL}; hence, the private





L) · ql]. Supplying Q
M, instead, “late-diers” can not distinguish
between the aggregate states {hHH} and {lHL} (or {lLH}) and so










When the signal precision Ψ  is low, the signals correlation co-
efficient is also low and this would mean that the probability the
two “insiders” do not enter the market together is high. However,
for low values of the correlation coefficient the “insiders” do not
enter the market since their expected profits are negative. It can
be shown that, for those values of Ψ that induce the “insiders” to









H) is close to 0. Hence, we can elim-
inate the strategy Q* = Q
M.
Finally, given the “insiders’” equilibrium strategies, the “mar-
ket clearing” conditions can be rewritten as follow:
α l(1 – K) = (1 – α l)Xe
α l(1 – K) + Q = (1 – α l)Xd
α h(1 – K) = (1 – α h)Xc
α l(1 – K) + 2Q = (1 – α l)Xc
A.M. BUFFA
113
Strategic Insider Trading with Imperfect Information, etc.α h(1 – K) + Q = (1 – α h)Xb
α h(1 – K) + 2Q = (1 – α h)Xa
where:
XHH(l) ≡ Xe, XHL(l) or XLH(l) ≡ Xd, XHH(h) ≡ Xc
XLL(l) ≡ Xc, XHL(h) or XLH(h) ≡ Xb, XLL(h) ≡ Xa
3. - Informativeness of Asset Prices
In Bhattacharya and Nicodano (2001) the asset payoff  is not
revealed by asset prices only when the “insider” masks her pres-
ence in the market. Hence, in all the other aggregate states the
informativeness of asset prices is perfect.
In this model, as in Bhattacharya and Nicodano (2001) (one
insider with perfect signal), the information of the signals is not
revealed only when the “insiders” succeed in masking their pres-
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GRAPH 1
SECONDARY MARKET OF THE RISKY 








XHH(l) XHL(l) XHH(h) XHL(h) XLL(h)
or
XLL(l)ence. However, even when the information is revealed, the unin-
formed agents can only infer through prices the type of signal but
not the asset payoff  because of the imperfection of the signals.
They will never know for certain if θ
˜ is higher or lower than 1.
Graph 1 shows the partitions of the aggregate states in the
interim market. We can notice that only in one of these aggregate
states, {lLL}, the “insiders” succeed in masking their presence.
However, the possibility for the informed agents to receive a wrong
signal prevents “outsiders” from knowing through prices the fu-
ture risky payoff for certain. In particular, when the “insiders” re-
ceive different signals, uninformed agents have the same prob-
ability (= 1/2 ) to guess the future return.
In Appendix 2 we show that “insiders’” expected profits are
lower when signal imprecision is higher. This occur because, when
Ψ  (index of signals precision) decreases, the expected gain rises,
because of the greater uncertainty transfered to the “outsiders”,
but by a rate of growth lower than the expected loss rate.
Moreover, another important contribution of this model deals
with the presence of two “insiders”, that is an oligopoly of private
information. As a matter of fact, the possibility for the two in-
formed agents to act not always in the same direction create two
further partitions of the aggregate states. These allow a better dis-
tribution of “outsiders’” uncertainty among these states. The pres-
ence of two intermediate aggregate states reduces the probability
to be in one of the farthest aggregate states inconsistently with
the future risky return. Therefore, we can conclude that, for the
same signal imperfection, the presence of an additional informed
agent leads to a lower “outsiders’” uncertainty, and then to a high-
er risky investment, if compared to the case of monopoly of pri-
vate information.
4. - Trading Volume
In this Section we carry out the analysis of numerical results
concerning trading volume. This analysis is based on the model
discussed in the previous Section with a particular choice for the
characterization of the signals.
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Strategic Insider Trading with Imperfect Information, etc.(38) ˜ S
1 = θ˜ + ε1
(39) ˜ S
2 = θ˜ + ε2
The two error terms have the same distribution:
(40)
where:
(41) x = θ H – θ L
In this way we assume that E(ε ˜) = 0 and then the expected
value of the signal is equal to the (unconditional) expected return
on the risky asset (E(˜ S)=   E(θ˜)).
Assuming that each error term of the signals is independent
of the other and of the future risky return:
(42) Corr(˜ ε1, ˜ ε2) = 0 and Corr(˜ εz, θ˜) = 0 ∀ z
the signals distribution is:
(43)
So, the conditional expected value of the risky return is:
(44)
We can, then, define the joint probabilities as follow:
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Given the independence assumption of signal error terms, the
signal correlation coefficient is equal to:
(46)
The signals correlation coefficient can be expressed as a func-
tion of the probabilities that characterize the two stochastic com-
ponents of the signals (θ˜ e ˜ ε):
(47) Corr(˜ S
1, ˜ S
2) = G (π, β )
The assumption of equiprobability ex ante of the risky return
distribution (π = 1/2 and then π H = π L) allows to express the sig-




2) = g (β)
Given the initial assumption on the signals error terms, it fol-
lows that the signal precision of the two informed agents is the
same. When β = 1 and γ= 0 equation (44) reveals that E(θ˜|Sk) =
θ k, therefore the conditional variance is equal to 0 while the index
of relative precision measure is equal to 1. On the contrary, the
conditional variance is equal to the unconditional variance when
β = 0: in this case “insiders” would not be better informed than
“outsiders”. Therefore, if β = 0 the capacity of the signal to ex-
plain the risky return variability is null, while if β = 1 it is per-
fect.
So, the index of relative precision of the signals can be con-
veniently expressed as a function of the probabilities that charac-
terize the two stochastic components of the signals (θ˜ and ˜ ε):
(49) Ψ = F (π , β)



















10 It is also possible to prove that, for values of β < 1, the signal correlation
coefficient Corr (˜ S
1, ˜ S
2)r eaches its maximum (in the interval [0, 1]) for π = 1/2.
This result comes also from Graph 2.
Strategic Insider Trading with Imperfect Information, etc.When π = 1/2 (and then π H = π L) the relative precision index
is a function only of the error term distribution
11:
(50) Ψ = f (β)
LEMMA 2
If  π H =  π L, then the relative precision index is equal to the
square of β:
(51) ˜ Ψ = β
2
The figures in Graph 2 represent equations (47), (48), (49)
and (50).
Furthermore, Graph 3 shows exactly what we argued in propo-
sition 1: the strategy to offer half of the monopolistic amount, giv-
en the assumptions on the signals error terms, dominates the strat-
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11 It is also possible to prove that, for values of β < 1, the signals relative pre-
cision index Ψ ˜ reaches its maximum for π = 1/2. This result comes also from
Graph 2.egy to offer the monopolistic amount. The broken curve with small
dashes represents the single “insider” expected profit if she decides
to offer Q
M, while the bold broken curve with small dashes repre-
sents her expected profit if she decides to offer Q
M/2.
The broken curve with big dashes and the bold broken curve
with big dashes, instead, represent the “insiders” aggregate ex-
pected profit respectively in the two previous cases. The continu-
ous curve represents the monopolist expected profit. It is possible
to notice that the aggregate expected profit (E(Π
1) + E(Π
2)), when
the strategic action is Q




We  have computed




12 The bold broken line with big dashes and the continuous line do not coin-
cide exactly because of not significant errors which characterize numerical reso-
lution.
13 The model has been worked out numerically using the software MATHE-
MATICA
©.
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GRAPH 3
EXPECTED PROFIT OF AN OLIGOPOLISTIC INSIDER
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β{π , q} = {1/2, 1/2}
{α l, α h} = {0.1, 0.15}, {0.9, 0.95}, {0.48, 0.53}, {0.45, 0.55}, {0.4, 0.6}
{θ L} ∈ {0.75, 0.8, 0.85, 0.9, 0.95}
{θ H} = {1.25, 1.3, 1.35, 1.4, 1.45, 1.5} 
U(C) = – C
–2
In the next Sections, we will adopt the following notation: KT
is the investment choice without insider trading, KI the invest-
ment choice with insider trading; ˜ φis the total trading volume
with insider trading, ˜ ζ the net trading volume with insider trad-
ing, while ˜ ϕ the trading volume without insider trading.
4.1 Total Trading Volume
Trading volume is equal to the amount of risky asset offered
by the “outsider early-diers” plus the possible aggregate supply of




s), that is, given the “mar-
ket clearing” condition, equal to the amount demanded by the
“outsider late-diers” (1 – α i)Xks(i).





∀ i ∈ {l, h} and ∀ k, s ∈ {L, H}
Expected trading volume with insider trading is therefore
equal to:
(53)
Expected trading volume without insider trading, instead, is
equal to:
(54)





ϕα () =− () ( ) []
= ∑ 1
   
Eq S S X i
il hkL H sL H
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=== ∑∑∑
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TABLE 1
TOTAL TRADING VOLUME
(α l = 0.48, α h = 0.53, β = 0.9)
θ H/θ L 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95
Average trading volume without insider trading –E(ϕ ∼)
1.25 –1.74754·10
–8 0.041367 0.108205 0.231043 0.242763
1.30 0.0276199 0.0682261 0.132585 0.238161 0.243581
1.35 0.047003 0.0865377 0.14831 0.238688 0.244194
1.40 0.0610873 0.0994388 0.158698 0.239036 0.244638
1.45 0.0715835 0.108732 0.16562 0.239264 0.244947
1.50 0.0795511 0.115523 0.1702 0.239397 0.245145
Average total trading volume with insider trading –E(φ ∼)
1.25 9.06054·10
–7 0.0455224 0.137218 0.256038 0.260949
1.30 0.0286356 0.0840548 0.173621 0.25741 0.260757
1.35 0.0563092 0.110861 0.198001 0.257397 0.260575
1.40 0.0767099 0.130219 0.214813 0.25728 0.2604
1.45 0.0921857 0.144561 0.226574 0.257081 0.260234
1.50 0.104175 0.155373 0.234594 0.256817 0.260075
Differences between total trading volumes – E(φ ∼) – E(ϕ ∼)
1.25 9.2553·10
–7 0.0041554 0.0290138 0.0249946 0.0181854
1.30 0.00101573 0.0158286 0.0410354 0.0192494 0.017176
1.35 0.00930625 0.0243234 0.0496909 0.0187089 0.016381
1.40 0.0156226 0.0307804 0.0561147 0.0182442 0.0157618
1.45 0.0206021 0.0358285 0.0609549 0.0178162 0.0152868
















TOTAL TRADING VOLUMETable 1 shows the average trading volume according to dif-
ferent combinations of beliefs on the risky return, for the two cas-
es of absence and presence of insider trading.
Average trading volume is higher if the market is charac-
terized by insider trading activity, for the same belief on the
risky return. This result is mirrored in Graph 4, which reports
on the horizontal axis the average trading volume with insider
trading and on the vertical axis the average trading volume with-
out: all the points are above the bisector, confirming this result.
Furthermore, this result holds true when the signals are perfect
(β = 1).
Therefore, the total average trading volume is higher than the
one which would characterize a market without insider trading,
for any degree of precision of the signals. This is consistent with
results presented in Cornell and Sirri (1992) and in Fishe and
Robe (2004).
Appendix 3 presents an analytical formulation of the total
trading volume, in order to understand analytically the conditions
which guarantee the result showed in this Section.
4.2 Trading Volume Net of Insider Trading
In the previous subsection we dealt with total trading vol-
ume, that is the volume traded by both the “outsiders” and the
“insiders”. We want now to analyze the volume traded only by
the uninformed agents. This analysis allows us to understand
how the presence of agents endowed with private information
could affect the “outsiders’” trading choices, and then their trad-
ing volume.
The distribution of trading volume net of insiders sales can
be defined as follow:









∀ i ∈ {l, h} and ∀ k, s ∈ {L, H}
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ing volume is equal to:
(56) E(˜ ζ) = (1 – KI) E(˜ α )
that is equal to the average supply of risky asset by the “outsider
early-diers”. Since E (˜ ϕ)= (1 – KT)E (˜ α ), the difference between the
two volumes is simply equal to the difference between the aver-
age supplies of risky asset.
(57) E(˜ ζ) – E(˜ ϕ) = [∆(1 – K)] E(˜ α )
Therefore,  E(˜ ζ) will be higher than E(˜ ϕ) only if “outsiders’”
risky investment choice with insider trading is higher than the
choice without insider trading. Graph 5 shows that the difference
between net trading volumes is positive in most cases.
A.M. BUFFA
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E(ϕ˜)Contrary to the results presented in Appendix 3, we can state
that:
1) it is sufficient and necessary that the following equation is
realized
(58) ∆ (1 – K) > 0
for the difference between net trading volumes to be positive, E(˜ ζ)
> E(˜ ϕ).
4.3 Net Trading Volume and Risk Sharing
Since we demonstrated that net trading volume increase is due
to a higher “outsiders’” investment in the risky asset, in this sub-
section we will analyze its non-univocal behavior. Table 2 shows
that: a) for low values of θ L the difference between net trading vol-
umes is positive (E(˜ ζ)– E(˜ ϕ) > 0); b) for high values of θ L the dif-
ference between net trading volumes is negative (E (˜ ζ)– E(˜ ϕ) < 0).
The explanation of this behaviour lies in the uninformed




(α l = 0.48, α h = 0.53, β = 0.9)
θ H/θ L 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95
E(˜ ζ)– E(ϕ ∼)
1.25 8.3719·10
–7 –0.000182544 0.0159379 0.000596159 –0.00668108
1.30 –0.00171303 0.00781884 0.0244906 –0.00527989 –0.00767224
1.35 0.0039404 0.0137592 0.0308229 –0.00581917 –0.0084498
1.40 0.00831271 0.0183715 0.0356447 –0.00627268 –0.00905238
1.45 0.0118175 0.0220529 0.0393641 –0.00668166 –0.00951148
1.50 0.014697 0.0250438 0.0420388 –0.00705238 –0.00985346
∆ (1– K)
1.25 1.6578·10
–6 –0.000361474 0.0315602 0.00118051 –0.0132299
1.30 –0.00339214 0.0154829 0.0484963 –0.0104552 –0.0151926
1.35 0.00780277 0.0272459 0.0610354 –0.0115231 –0.0167323
1.40 0.0164608 0.0363791 0.0705835 –0.0124211 –0.0179255
1.45 0.0234011 0.0436692 0.0779487 –0.013231 –0.0188346
1.50 0.0291031 0.0495917 0.0832451 –0.0139651 –0.0195118agents “risk sharing”. If the risk sharing improves with insider
trading, then the risky investment will increase and, as a conse-
quence, net trading volume will be higher as well. Still, we have
to explain why the risk sharing improves and why this happens
only under some circumstances.
First of all, the risk sharing improves if the information in
the market is greater and above all more precise. If we initially
consider the model with perfect information, we can state that the
future risky return is rightly revealed in a subset of the aggregate
states. Without insider trading, since the private information can’t
be revealed in any aggregate states, “outsider late-diers” would buy
the “long term” asset paying to “outsider early-diers” the same as-
set price independently from its future return. With insider trad-
ing, instead, they would pay a higher price if the information re-
vealed a “High” future return and a lower price if it revealed a
“Low” return. The improved “outsiders’” risk sharing
14, due to the
presence of insider trading, means that at t = 1 “late-diers” agents
will pay a price coherent with the future risky return and then
with the consumption at t = 2. Without asymmetric information
they would pay a price too low if ˜ θ = θ H or too high if ˜ θ = θ L.
Introducing now signal imperfection, risk sharing will im-
prove only if this imperfection does not lead to an uncertainty for
the uninformed agents such that the positive effect above de-
scribed is offset. If the signals were very imprecise, the “outsiders”
would risk to pay a high price
15 receiving then a “Low” future re-
turn. Therefore, signals imperfection reduces the benefit to pay a
price coherent with the future risky return.
In this Section we have shown that for β values approximately
lower than 0.75 the two “insiders” would not be disposed to trade
because their expected profit would be negative. Therefore, it is
possible to maintain that signal imperfection reduces the positive
effect of “risk sharing” but it does not offset it entirely because
for very imprecise signals informed agents would not enter the
market. Table 3 points out the trend of the difference between
A.M. BUFFA
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14 We can define it as “non-zero sum sharing”.
15 And not an intermediate price which would be paid without insider trad-
ing.
Strategic Insider Trading with Imperfect Information, etc.risky investment in the two cases of presence and absence of in-
sider trading, according to different signals imprecision degrees.
Now, we will focus on the reason why the net trading volume
decreases only for high values of θ L. At this regard it is necessary,
also through a graphic analysis, to examine the behaviour of the
risky investment choice in the two already mentioned cases.
The figures in Graph 6 show, for the same θ H, the trend of (1 –
KT) (continuous curve) and of (1 – KI) (broken curve) according to
increasing values of θ L. Of course, this analysis is valid for all those
values of β such that “insiders” have incentive to enter the market.
Without insider trading, the rise of θ L leads to increasing rises
of the risky investment, but, for values of θ L next to 1, the in-
vestment growing rate decreases considerably. As a matter of fact,
for high values of θ L the risky investment has already reached very
high levels and then any further increase of θ L would lead to a
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2004
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TABLE 3
RISKY INVESTMENT AND SIGNALS PRECISION INDEX
(α l = 0.48, α h = 0.53)
θ H/θ L 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95
∆ (1– K) – (β = 0.9)
1.25 1.6578·10
–6 –0.000361474 0.0315602 0.00118051 –0.0132299
1.30 –0.00339214 0.0154829 0.0484963 –0.0104552 –0.0151926
1.35 0.00780277 0.0272459 0.0610354 –0.0115231 –0.0167323
1.40 0.0164608 0.0363791 0.0705835 –0.0124211 –0.0179255
1.45 0.0234011 0.0436692 0.0779487 –0.013231 –0.0188346
1.50 0.0291031 0.0495917 0.0832451 –0.0139651 –0.0195118
∆ (1– K) – (β = 0.75)
1.25 4.72377·10
–6 –0.00181671 0.0205797 –0.00234768 –0.0140501
1.30 –0.00368648 0.00957682 0.0325673 –0.0120245 –0.0157694
1.35 0.00436931 0.0179802 0.0412361 –0.0129251 –0.0171822
1.40 0.0105801 0.0244264 0.0476295 –0.0136905 –0.0182743
1.45 0.0155227 0.0294851 0.0523801 –0.0143787 –0.0191044
1.50 0.0195411 0.0335047 0.0558867 –0.0150008 –0.019721
∆ (1– K) – (β = 0.5)
1.25 0.0000168313 –0.00453575 0.00320091 –0.00796403 –0.0169672
1.30 –0.00452359 0.000054263 0.00788671 –0.0186949 –0.0170916
1.35 –0.00128368 0.00340929 0.0111084 –0.0172023 –0.0175579
1.40 0.00121538 0.0059151 0.0133537 –0.0160331 –0.0184745
1.45 0.00317657 0.00780947 0.0149136 –0.00152129 –0.0191661
1.50 0.00473203 0.00925065 0.015993 –0.0154842 –0.0196735positive but decreasing benefit. The figures in Graph 6 clearly
show this “turning point” coming out for θ L   0.9.
Therefore, we can state that:
(59)
(60)
A higher probability for “late-diers” agents to pay an asset price
coherent with the future risky return (and then coherent with the
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GRAPH 6
RISKY INVESTMENT CHOICES (β = 0.9)
θ H = 1.25 θ H = 1.30
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0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95consumption at t = 2) leads to a greater risky investment. Never-
theless, this effect decreases considerably for high values of θ L.
As a matter of fact, if θ L increases, for the same θ H and if the
future return were “Low” (< 1), then uninformed agents would have
a high probability to pay a price coherent with this return but clos-
er and closer to the price they would have paid without insider
trading
16. Therefore, for high values of θ L the positive effect of the
“risk sharing” on the risky investment is definitely weaker.
Moreover, thanks to an improved risk sharing, the risky in-
vestment will reach before those high values for which any fur-
ther increase of θ L leads to a positive but decreasing benefit
17. So,
the “turning point” with insider trading will happen for a value
of θ L lower than the one characterizing the case without insider
trading. As a consequence, according to different values of θ L, we





Finally, the evidence whereby (1 – KT) is higher than (1 –
KI) for values of θ > x means that in the interval y < θ L < x, the
risky investment without insider trading not only has grown
more than the one with insider trading, but it has exceeded it.
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16 The lower θ L, the greater benefit increase.
17 This effect is as greater as higher θ H.This analysis pointed out, therefore, that the “risk sharing” is
able to explain the reason why net trading volume is higher with
insider trading, despite imperfect information.
4.4 Trading Volume and Signal Imperfection
This last subsection shows the effect of signal imperfection
on total and net trading volume.
4.4.1 Net Trading Volume
As far as the net trading volume is concerned we demon-
strated that the difference between this volume and the one with-
out insider trading is equal to the difference between the average
supply of risky asset.
(65) E(˜ ζ ) – E(˜ ϕ) = [∆(1 – K)] E(˜ α )
Moreover, in the previous subsection we showed that a more
imperfect signal reduces the risky investment with insider trading
and the difference between this investment and the one without
insider trading:
(66)
This, as already argued, is due to the greater uncertainty for
uninformed agents, who face asset prices which could also in-
corporate a wrong information on the future risky return. The
greater the signal imperfection, the higher the probability that as-
set prices reveal a wrong information.
Since E(˜ α ) is not affected by the signal precision, we can con-
clude that:
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The difference between net trading volumes will be as greater
as higher the signals precision will be.
4.4.2 Total Trading Volume
Concerning total trading volume, it is opportune to anticipate
equation  (113), developed in Appendix 3, which represents the
necessary and sufficient condition for the difference between to-
tal trading volumes to be positive E(˜ ϕ) E(ϕ > 0).
(68)
Maintaining the assumption of equiprobability of the future




we can conclude that the rise in signal imperfection reduces the
difference between the total trading volume in the two cases of
presence and absence of insider trading.
(71)
Analyzing numerical results we notice that the above men-
tioned difference, even though it decreases, remains positive for
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130every value of β. Therefore, the total amount of risky asset traded
in the market is always higher (for deeply imperfect signals too)
if this market is characterized by insider trading.
5. - Concluding Remarks
A model of insider trading is used to analyze the behaviour
of trading volume in financial markets characterized by asym-
metric information. This model extends the one in Bhattacharya
and Nicodano (2001) by introducing competition among informed
traders and imperfection of their private information.
As far as total trading volume is concerned, this is always
higher than the volume traded absent insider trading. Moreover,
the possibility to model uninformed agent as agents with well-
specified preferences allows to understand if the presence of in-
sider trading leads them to trade more. In the paper it is demon-
strated that net trading volume is equal to early-diers average sup-
ply of risky asset. Since this is proportional to risky investment
by outsiders, we sought for the conditions which justify a rise in
the risky investment by uninformed agents.
Contrary to implications of adverse selection models, and con-
sistent with empirical evidence, in most cases risky investment is
higher if the market is characterized by asymmetric information.
It is slightly lower only for high values of the “Low” future return.
There is a clear explanation, based on an improved “risk sharing”
among uninformed agents, for these results.
The presence of insider trading leads to a better “risk shar-
ing” because the information revealed by prices to market partici-
pants is greater and more precise. As a matter of fact, in a sub-
set of aggregate states, future risky return is correctly revealed, if
the signals are perfect, and has a high probability to be correctly
revealed, if the signals are imperfect. Therefore, with insider trad-
ing the “late-diers” would pay a price for the risky asset which is
consistent with the future risky payoff. Without insider trading,




Strategic Insider Trading with Imperfect Information, etc.As already mentioned, signal imperfection implies a lower
risky investment if compared with the case of perfect private in-
formation. This is due to a greater uncertainty for uninformed
agents, who could infer from prices the wrong future risky return
since insiders receive imperfect signals.
Another important result deals with risky investment and net
trading volume in the cases of monopoly (one only insider) and
oligopoly (two insiders), for the same signals imperfection. Nu-
merical results show that ex-ante risky investment and net trad-
ing volume are higher if there are two rather than one insider in
the market. This is due to the higher number of possible aggre-
gate states, which reduces the probability for “late-diers” to pay a
very high price when the future risky return will be L-type and a
very low price when the risky return will be H-type. So, the high-
er is the number of informed agents, the lower is the probability
for “late-diers” to be in one of the farthest aggregate states in-
consistently with the future risky return. Indeed, with two insiders
who receive imperfect signals there are two more aggregate states,
which take place when only one of them enters the market.
This model suffers from the assumption of risky neutrality
which characterizes the informed agents; therefore, removing this
assumption we would avoid that they were at the same time in-
siders and insurers. Moreover, a promising development of this
research could consist in modifying outsiders’ preferences as in
Bhattacharya and Gale (1987).
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1. - Proofs
1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
(72) Cov(XY) = E(XY) – E(X)E(Y)
(73) Var(X) = E(X
2) – E(X)
2
Then the covariance between the two signals will be equal to:
(74) Cov(˜ S
1 ˜ S
2) = E(˜ S
1 ˜ S











˜ θ )E(˜ ε1) + E(
˜ θ )E(˜ ε2) + E(˜ ε1)E(˜ ε2)
Since:
(76) E(˜ ε) = 0

























Moreover, given σ˜ S
1 = σ˜ S
2,
(82) σ ˜ S
1 = σ˜ S
2 = Var(˜ S)
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(83)
with:
(84) Var(˜ S) = Var(
˜ θ ) + Var(˜ ε)
1.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Given the equiprobability assumption of the risky asset dis-
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2. - Insiders’ Expected Profit
It is necessary to understand if and how greater “outsiders’”
uncertainty could benefit the informed agents. An “insider’s” ex-
pected profit can be divided in two parts, the expected gain (E(Γ)),
that is obtained if the signal is consistent with the future return,
and the expected loss (E(ϒ)), that is suffered if the signal reveals
a future return different from the real one. Because of the sym-
metry of the signals, we can focus our analysis just on “insider 1”
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1
p) = 0
Analyzing numerical results of both the two above mentioned
models, the following relations hold for both “insiders”:
(96) E(Γ) > E(Π p)
(97) E(Π ) < E(Π p)
The expected gain with imperfect information is higher than
the expected profit with perfect information
18, when the signal is
right, but the expected loss, when the signal is wrong, offsets and
exceeds the expected gain, thus making the expected profit always
lower than the one with perfect information. The possibility that
the private information could be revealed wrongly represents an
advantage for every “insider” because it increases her expected
gain, but, on the other side, the signal imperfection leads to the
possibility to have positive expected losses.
We compare below the expected gain, loss and profit, obtained
by an oligopolistic “insider” with an imperfect signal. We consid-
er different signal imperfection degrees and use as “benchmark”
the expected profit of an oligopolistic “insider” endowed with per-
fect information. When the signal imperfection increases (i.e.
when β decreases) the expected gain rises, because of the greater
uncertainty transfered to the outsiders, but by a rate of growth
lower than the one which characterizes the expected loss.
(98)
(99)
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18 The expected gain with imperfect information is also higher than the ex-
pected gain with perfect information because, if the signal is perfect, the expect-
ed loss is always equal to 0.(100)
Graph 7 shows that, under the same conditions, the expect-
ed profit of an oligopolistic “insider” reaches its maximum when
the signal is perfect (Ψ = 1). The “benchmark” is represented by
the horizontal continuous line, the expected gain, loss and prof-
it respectively by the broken curve with small dashes, the broken
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GRAPH 7
COMPONENTS OF THE EXPECTED PROFIT OF AN
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β3. - Trading Volume Analytical Formulation
An analytical formulation allows to confirm and better inter-
pret results obtained from the model’s numerical resolution. Using
equations (54) and (53) we obtain the following equations.
(101) E(˜ ϕ) = (1 – KT) E(˜ α )
(102) E(˜ φ ) = (1 – KI) E(˜ α ) + E(˜ QA)
where QA is the aggregate amount of risky asset sold by the two
“insiders”:  QA =  Q
1
k +  Q
2
s ∀ k,  s ∈ {L,H}. The average trading vol-
ume with insider trading is equal to “early-diers” and “insider” av-
erage supplies of risky asset
19.
Expressing trading volume with insider trading as a function
only of “outsiders”’ risky investment, we obtain:
(103)
with:




Now, it is necessary to analyze the difference between trad-
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H).ing volume in the two cases of presence and absence of insider
trading.
(106)
The following remarks rise from equation (106).
1) if ∆  (1 – K) = 0, then trading volume with insider trading
is always higher than trading volume without;
2) if ∆  (1 – K) > 0, then trading volume with insider trading
is always higher than trading volume without;
3) if ∆  (1 – K) < 0, then the difference between trading vol-
ume will be positive (E(˜ φ ) > E(˜ ϕ)) if:
(107)
and negative (E(˜ ϕ) > E(˜ φ )) if:
(108)
Dwelling upon the third case and considering
(109)
it is important to precise that Ω is always negative (and   –1)
conditionally to the three constraints on α i, i ∈ {l, h}:
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Moreover, we can observe that the following derivatives of the
difference between trading volumes are both positive:
(110)
(111)
Table 4 and the figures in Graph 8 report the difference be-
tween trading volumes (continuous curve) and the differences be-
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TABLE 4
TRADING VOLUME AND RISKY INVESTMENT
(α l = 0.48, α h = 0.53, β = 0.9)
θ H/θ L 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95
Differences between total trading volumes – E(˜ φ ) – E(˜ ϕ)
1.25 9.2353·10
–7 0.0041554 0.0290138 0.0249946 0.0181854
1.30 0.00101573 0.0158286 0.0410354 0.0192494 0.017176
1.35 0.00930625 0.0243234 0.0496909 0.0187089 0.016381
1.40 0.0156226 0.0307804 0.0561147 0.0182442 0.0157618
1.45 0.0206021 0.0358285 0.0609549 0.0178162 0.0152868
1.50 0.0246242 0.0398497 0.0643938 0.0174204 0.0149298
Risk investment levels withous insider trading – (1– KT)
1.25 –3.46048·10
–8 0.0819148 0.214266 0.457511 0.48072
1.30 0.0546928 0.135101 0.262545 0.471606 0.482339
1.35 0.0930752 0.171362 0.293684 0.47265 0.483552
1.40 0.120965 0.196909 0.314254 0.473338 0.484432
1.45 0.14175 0.215311 0.327959 0.473791 0.485043
1.50 0.157527 0.228759 0.33703 0.474053 0.485437
Differences between risk investments – ∆ (1– K)
1.25 1.6578·10
–6 –0.000361474 0.0315602 0.00118051 –0.0132299
1.30 –0.00339214 0.0154829 0.0484963 –0.0104552 –0.0151926
1.35 0.00780277 0.0272459 0.0610354 –0.0115231 –0.0167323
1.40 0.0164608 0.0363791 0.0705835 –0.0124211 –0.0179255
1.45 0.0234011 0.0436692 0.0779487 –0.013231 –0.0188346
1.50 0.0291031 0.0495917 0.0832451 –0.0139651 –0.0195118A.M. BUFFA
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GRAPH 8
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TRADING VOLUMES AND

















































θ H = 1.25
θ H = 1.35
θ H = 1.45
θ H = 1.30
θ H = 1.40
θ H = 1.50
0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
Through this analysis of the components which affect trading
volume, we attain to the following conclusions:
1) it is sufficient but not necessary, for the difference between
total trading volumes to be positive, E(˜ φ ) > E(˜ ϕ), that the follow-
ing equation is realized:
(112) ∆(1 – K) ≥ 0
2) it is sufficient and necessary, for the difference betweentotal trading volumes to be positive, E(˜ φ ) > E(˜ ϕ), that the follow-
ing equation is realized:
(113)
These results, however, can not be expressed as functions of
the exogenous variables of the model because of its numerical
resolution.
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